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Abstract 
Various epidemics have arisen in rural locations through human-animal interaction, such as the H1N1 outbreak of 2009. To 
study the spreading of infectious diseases in rural regions, we have surveyed a rural county and its communities, and 
collected a dataset characterizing the rural population. From the respondents’ answers, we build a social (face-to-face) 
contact network. With this network, we explore the potential spread of epidemics through a Susceptible-Latent-Infected-
Recovered (SLIR) disease model. We simulate an exact model of a stochastic SLIR Poisson process with disease 
parameters representing several infectious illnesses. To explore an array of potential diseases, we vary the infection rate 
across the spectrum of outbreaks and quantify the social network susceptibility through the whole spectrum. The extent to 
which social dynamics can control the spreading process is studied across this disease strength spectrum. We explore two 
models of a susceptible individual’s dynamics in response to infections observed among the individuals in his 
neighborhood, namely preventive behavior adoption and social distancing. Through extensive simulations, our investigation 
reveals the potentially powerful impacts of social spontaneous responses in rural settings. We compare the strategies over 
the spectrum, and demonstrate that behavioral responses are most effective in the intermediate range of infection strengths.  
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1. Introduction 
In general, the spread of infectious diseases can be contained by human response using different approaches. 
When vaccines are not available, it is important to resort to spontaneous changes in individuals’ behavior 
toward contagion-preventive habits. Modeling spontaneous human reactions to the spread of infectious disease 
is an extremely important topic in current epidemiology [1], and has recently attracted substantial attention. A 
review of the existing results on the interaction of the epidemic spreading and the human behavior can be found 
in [2]. In particular, Poletti et. al. developed a population-based model where susceptible individuals could 
choose between two behaviors in response to presence of infection [3]. Funk et. al. showed that awareness of 
individuals on the presence of a disease has interconnected dynamics with the disease itself, and awareness can 
help reducing the epidemic size [4]. Perra et. al. [5] considered the case where individuals go to a "feared" state 
when they sense infection. Since most of the existing results are for population-based models, they are suitable 
for a society of well-mixed individuals. Concerning individual-based models, a new model, in which an "alert" 
state is considered, has been proposed in [6]. In any case, assessing the effectiveness of mitigation strategies 
and behavioral responses both from a public health point of view and from individuals’ perspectives is a 
complex and not fully-explored problem. In particular, a thorough evaluation and comparison of feasible 
mitigation strategies in the specific setting of rural regions is missing. In other words, not only the amount of 
success a given strategy can provide is not determined, but also its related cost in economical and social terms 
is unknown.  
 
In this paper, we carry out extensive simulations on a weighted contact network determined by collected 
data in the City of Chanute and Neosho County in the State of Kansas. In particular we study the impact of 
contact reductions [7] and social alertness [6] as mitigation strategies over a spectrum of disease strengths. Our 
contribution consists in providing a thorough analysis and comparison of mitigation strategies in a rural region. 
We derive results on which mitigation strategy has greater potential to be efficient as a function of the epidemic 
strength. We expect that our results can guide the development of practical guidelines for health officials to 
contain and suppress epidemics in rural regions. We describe data collection and analysis in section 2. Section 
3 includes the models descriptions for the network, for the epidemic spreading, and also for mitigation 
strategies. In section 4, results are presented and discussed. Finally section 5 concludes our article. 
2. Data Collection and Analysis 
As of the 2010 U.S. Census, Neosho County was a rural county with 16,512 residents in 571.5 square miles 
in southeastern Kansas.  Most of the population was White (94.1%); a majority were female (50.6%) and many 
(17.4%) were 65 years of age or older.  The median household income was $36,702 with 17.0% living below 
the poverty level.  Between July and October 2010, the towns of Chanute, Thayer, and Galesburg were selected 
to participate in a survey concerning factors that would predict the spread of epidemics in rural areas. The final 
number of available and eligible households were 143, 65, and 162 in Thayer, Galesburg, and Chanute, 
respectively, with total N = 370. A tailored design method was used to incentivize survey responses obtaining a 
final overall response rate of 65.4%. 
A majority (56%) of the respondents reported being from Chanute compared to 23% from Thayer and 10% 
from Galesburg (the remaining percentage did not specify).  Of the 357 participants, the largest number were 
ages 45 to 64 (47.1%), with 26.1% 65 years of age or older and 18.8% (26-44) and 8.1% (18 to 25) younger 
than 45. Due to rounding, the percentages do not sum to 100.0. In the following, we report two key results. In 
terms of compliance, nearly 49% of respondents said they would still visit at least one or two households 
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outside of their home if there was a serious epidemic and mass media had told them to remain at home and not 
visit with others. Figure 1 presents the distribution of the number of individuals that a respondent expects to 
still visit against advice. Additionally, about 80% of the respondents had extensive contact with domestic pets 
on a daily basis while about 19% of respondents had contact with farm animals or wild animals regularly, 
shown in figure 2. Additional details on these results are available in [8]. 
 
Figure 1. The distribution of the number of households that a 
respondent expects to still visit in a week against advice during a 
serious epidemic is shown. 
Figure 2. The distribution of types of animals a respondent 
interacts with in a typical day is shown. Note that the total does not 
sum to one as respondents can interact with multiple types of 
animals. 
3. Models 
In this section, the procedure to construct the contact network from survey data is explained. Furthermore, 
the compartmental model used for simulations, and the human response models are described. Finally, a cost 
function, to compare the effectiveness of the different containment strategies is introduced. 
Network. From the survey responses, we constructed a rural contact network as an estimation of the social 
contact structure among the survey respondents. The network is based on two central questions: the number of 
contacts that a person has, and the locations that a person visits at different times in a typical day. The basis for 
the interactions between a pair of respondents is the locations that they both visited in common. We considered 
4 types of location-based interactions: both visit the same location in the morning, both visit the same location 
in the afternoon, both visit the same location in the evening, and both visit the same location regardless of time. 
The fourth category introduces some overlapping in the interactions, but it helps model the similarities in 
respondents’ behavior and chance of meeting. We considered 66 locations in the network construction and 
therefore 264 = 66  4 possible interactions between each pair of survey respondents. We compute normalized 
weights from each respondent i to each other respondent j given by lij, representing the number of location-
based interactions between respondents i and j. For the few respondents who did not complete the section of the 
survey regarding location visits, we assign them uniform weights of interacting with every other respondent in 
the network. Letting nodes represent the set of N = 353 respondents and weighted links represent the contact 
between them; we have a symmetric contact network at this point. Next we uniformly scale the weights on the 
links directed outward from each respondent i such that the sum of these weights is equal to the number of 
contacts that respondent i has indicated having with his or her response (wij = ai*lij for every j in 1, 2, … N). 
(This scaling makes irrelevant the absolute value of the uniform weight of the respondents who lack location 
data.) This produced a weighted, directed (asymmetrical) contact network of 353 nodes, with each pair of nodes 
(i and j) connected by two links which are respectively characterized by the weights wij and wji. 
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The rural contact network is depicted in figure 3, where the nodes representing individuals are shown in 
purple in a cloud and they are connected to the locations that they frequent, shown as orange nodes on the map. 
A thorough analysis of this network is conducted in [8]. 
 
Figure 3. A depiction of the rural contact network developed from a survey of Neosho County is shown, where the individuals are 
represented by purple nodes in a “cloud,” which is connected by the respondents local travel habits to the set of rural locations shown in 
orange on the map. 
SLIR model. On this weighted network, we model an epidemic outbreak using a Susceptible-Latent-
Infected-Recovered compartmental model (SLIR) [8, 9]. In the SLIR model, we assume infections arrive at a 
susceptible (S) node j from an infected (I) node i with a rate that is a product of the directed contact wij and the 
basic infection rate . When an infection arrives to a susceptible node, the node takes on a latent infection 
(transfers from the susceptible compartment to the latent compartment). A node, once latent (L), is considered 
unable to spread the disease, but is developing to that stage with rate . The inverse of the rate  is the expected 
time for a node to spend in the latent state. The next stage of the disease, the infected/infectious state, enables 
the node to spread infections to each of its neighbors at rates proportional to the weights on its outgoing links. 
Each infected node recovers from the infected state at a rate μ. Once a node is in the recovered state (R), it 
remains recovered and does not participate in the disease process any further. We simulate this model exactly 
using an event-driven simulation of the SLIR process on the weighted rural contact network. We initialize the 
simulation by assigning a disease state to each node and then drawing exponential waiting times for the next 
event at each node. Taking the event with the minimum time across all nodes, we advance the event node to its 
next disease state and re-draw waiting times for all nodes. This step is repeated until all waiting times are 
infinite, which happens when the disease process is complete. At this point, all nodes will be either susceptible 
or recovered. In the event-driven simulation, the time periods between successive events will not be regular, 
but instead they are non-integer stochastic values. This time variability can be observed in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Under no mitigation, with a basic infection rate of  = 0.042 (days)-1,  = (1.1 days)-1, and recovery rate of μ = (2.5 days)-1, a 
sample outbreak is shown by depicting the total number of infected individuals as a fraction of the population through time. 
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Social Alertness Responses. Given the estimated survey respondents contact network and the epidemic 
model, we explore two potential classes of social responses to an epidemic. The first class captures social 
alertness, as an extension of the model presented in [6]. In this model we take into account the behavior of 
susceptible individuals. Specifically, as susceptible individuals recognize that an infection exists, they decide to 
adopt a cautious behavior. We have modeled the cautious behavior with a lower infection rate. In order to 
model the behavior of susceptible individuals, we add a new compartment to the considered SLIR model for 
epidemic spread, to define a new Susceptible-Alert-Latent-Infected-Recovered (SALIR) model. The state 
transition diagram for the SALIR model is shown in figure 5. Both susceptible and alert individuals can 
potentially become exposed. However, the infection rate of the alert individuals is lower. Specifically, a 
susceptible node becomes alert with the alerting rate  times the number of infected neighbors. An alert 
individual can get infected in a process similar to a susceptible individual but with a smaller infection rate a 
such that 0  a < . We assume that transition from an alert individual to a susceptible state is much slower 
than other transitions. In this model, the transition to the alert state is driven by the number of infected 
neighbors and produces a reduced incoming infection rate. 
 
Figure 5. Transition diagram for the Susceptible-Alert-Latent-Infected-Recovered (SALIR) epidemic model with social alertness 
represented by compartment “A”.  
Social Distancing Responses. The second class of social responses considers a scenario similar to [7], where 
individuals reduce their levels of contact with their neighbors, if they sense a risk of infection. As a social 
behavioral constraint, we guarantee a minimal level of contact all the time. In [7], an optimal control problem is 
formulated to minimize the total infection cases during the spread of epidemics with minimal social distancing 
effort. The controller variables are the weights of the contact network. The objective is to find optimal contact 
weights to minimize a cost function. The cost function is a weighted sum of the new infection cases and the 
cost associated with the social distancing effort. However, the social distancing patterns are actually 
decentralized in nature. For example, an individual will adopt a social distancing behavior according to his/her 
costs and perception of risk. In other words, the social distancing behavior of an individual is not necessarily to 
benefit the whole network, but rather, to maximize a personal utility function. 
In this paper, we define personal social distancing behaviors that are sub-optimal solutions of the original 
social distancing problem. The weight reduction is driven by the infection incoming from each neighbor, using 
a threshold value for the infection probability, the infection awareness threshold Ith, which triggers the 
reduction. Once a weight on a contact link is reduced, it remains at this reduced level until the infecting node 
recovers or the (formerly) susceptible node has reached the infected state. An example of contact level 
reduction is depicted in figure 6. Node 1 is the individual under consideration, and nodes 2-6 are its neighbors. 
The thicknesses of the links between node 1 and the neighbors represent the levels of contact. Nodes 2, 4, and 5 
are in a closer contact with node 1 than nodes 3 and 6, as shown on the left panel of figure 6. Suppose now that 
an epidemic starts. Some nodes stay susceptible (green), while others become infected (red). Different tones of 
red represent different levels of infections, with higher force of infection being represented by darker red. In the 
right panel of figure 6, node 1 is healthy or susceptible and needs to protect itself from receiving the infection 
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from the infected nodes 3-6. However, the forces of infection from nodes 3 and 6 are less than the threshold Ith, 
so the contact level is not varied from the original value. The contact level between node 1 and 2 is not reduced 
since node 2 is healthy; while the contact levels with nodes 4 and 5 is reduced because these neighbors have 
forces of infection higher than the threshold. 
  
Contact network for node 1 Contact reduction as a function of infectiousness levels 
Figure 6. Example of contact level reduction for node 1 when nodes 5 and 4 reach a value of the infection greater than the threshold. 
Evaluation Function for Comparison. We develop a cost function that enables the comparison of the 
mitigation strategies from a pseudo-resource perspective. The function is designed to capture the change in the 
weights representing social contact similar to [7], but it also considers an “effective” change to the social 
contact by a reduction in the total infection rate wij . Including the basic infection rate  allows it to also 
compute a cost for the social alertness response. We express the cost as 
    
01 1
'( ' ) ,
final
ij
tN N
ij
i j t
w w dtC     (1) 
where wij  and  are the (constant) weight and (constant) basic infection rate without mitigation. For the social 
alertness responses, the weights are kept constant, leaving an integration of the change in basic infection rates 
over time. Similarly, for the dynamic contact responses, the basic infection rate is kept constant, leaving an 
integration of the changes in the weights over time. The cost function, when applied to the dynamic contact 
responses, is identical to the cost function used in [7] if it were scaled by the basic infection rate . 
4. Results 
We performed 16,000,000 simulations to investigate potential epidemics and the proposed vaccination and 
spontaneous response strategies for the rural contact network across a wide spectrum. To mimic an epidemic 
with the stochastic SLIR model, we set  = (1.1 days) -1 and μ = (2.5 days) -1. We explored a wide range of 
values for the basic infection rate: 500 values varying from  = (100 days) -1 to  = (0.2 days) -1. Previous work 
had explored only a single value of  = (2.5 days)-1 [9]. For each strategy and each value of , we ran 1000 
simulations to sample the stochastic space of the epidemic model. Therefore one “set” of simulations contains 
0.5 million simulations. For each simulation, we track the numbers of nodes in each disease state through time 
as well as the timings of all event occurrences. Additionally we capture the total cases of each outbreak and the 
cost of the associated mitigation strategy. We simplify the presentation of the data by computing and plotting 
the average and 95% range of the resulting total cases and costs for each group of 1000 simulations on a single 
1
4
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3
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3
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. For displaying the range of  values, we adopt an inverted infection rate axis, which explores a spectrum of 
epidemic strengths on a network [10]. We summarize in figure 7 the estimated ranges of disease strengths of 
various known threats with respect to the spectrum of disease strengths which we explore through simulation (0 
< μ/   40). We have scaled the estimated ranges by the average weight on the links of the contact network to 
separate the contact from the basic infection rate. 
 
Figure 7. The estimated ranges of disease strengths of current and historical epidemic threats are stacked in increasing level of infection 
rates over the spectrum of disease strengths (0 < μ/   40) explored in each set of simulation for various mitigation strategies. 
The first case to consider is the set of potential epidemics when there is no mitigation response. From the 
“set” of simulations without any mitigation, we show a sample of an outbreak for a basic infection rate of  = 
0.042 (days) -1 in figure 8. Figure 9 summarizes the distributions of the total cases and thus the total sizes of 
epidemics within the population in the manner described above. As the infection rate decreases, the epidemic 
size decreases in a non-linear manner. 
 
Figure 8. Under no mitigation, with a basic infection rate of  = 
0.042 (days)-1,  = (1.1 days)-1, and recovery rate of μ = (2.5 days)-1, 
a sample outbreak is shown by depicting the new cases of infection 
per day. 
Figure 9. Under no mitigation, the distributions of the total cases as 
a fraction of the considered population over several values of the 
basic infection rate are represented by their averages (blue stars), 
lower 2.5% sample (green squares), and upper 97.5% sample (red 
triangles). As the infection rate decreases, the epidemic size 
decreases in a non-linear manner. 
Social Alertness Responses. We ran twelve sets of simulations to consider the social alertness strategy 
described in Section 3 under various values of the alerting rate . We set the alerted basic infection rate to a = 
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0.1  and tested values of  from 10-6 to 0.5 [6]. A higher  value represents a stronger mitigation strategy, but it 
will also come at a higher cost as it causes more nodes to reduce their incoming infection rates. Figures 10 and 
11 present the prevented cases and cost distributions for =0.005 and a stronger mitigation with =0.1. 
 
Figure 10. Under spontaneous social alertness responses to the epidemics with alerting rates of =0.005 (left) and =0.1 (right), the 
distributions of the prevented cases  as a fraction of the considered population over several values of the basic infection rate are represented 
by their averages (blue stars), lower 2.5% sample (green squares), and upper 97.5% sample (red triangles). 
 
Figure 11. Under spontaneous social alertness responses to the epidemics with alerting rates of =0.005 (left) and =0.1 (right), the 
distributions of the total mitigation cost values (From Equation 1) over several values of the basic infection rate are represented by their 
averages (blue stars), lower 2.5% sample (green squares), and upper 97.5% sample (red triangles) on a vertical log scale. 
Social Distancing Responses. We ran twelve sets of simulations to consider the dynamic social distancing 
response described in Section 3, under various values of the infection awareness threshold Ith. We set the 
minimal weight parameter to  = 0.1 and tested values of Ith from 10-6 to 0.5 [7]. A lower Ith value represents a 
stronger mitigation strategy, but it will also come at a higher cost as it causes more nodes to reduce their 
incoming contact levels (the weights on the incoming weights). Figures 12 and 13 present the prevented cases 
and cost distributions for Ith= 0.005 and for a stronger mitigation with Ith= 10-6. 
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Figure 12. Under spontaneous social distancing responses to the epidemics with infection thresholds of Ith= 0.005 and Ith= 0.000001, the 
distributions of the prevented cases as a fraction of the considered population over several values of the basic infection rate are represented 
by their averages (blue stars), lower 2.5% sample (green squares), and upper 97.5% sample (red triangles). 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Under spontaneous social distancing responses to the epidemics with infection thresholds of Ith= 0.005 and Ith= 0.000001, the 
distributions of the total mitigation cost values (From Equation 1) over several values of the basic infection rate are represented by their 
averages (blue stars), lower 2.5% sample (green squares), and upper 97.5% sample (red triangles) on a vertical log scale. 
 
Comparison. Table 1 presents the efficiencies of the social alertness and social distancing strategies. Values 
in table 1 integrate the total cases curves in a manner similar to Viral Conductance [10], to give a measure of 
the overall epidemic potential under each method. The first column represents the integration using the average 
total cases curve, while the second column uses the 97.5% samples. A lower value in table 3 represents a more 
successful mitigation (on average across the infection rate range). The success of the two social response 
approaches depends significantly on how strong of a response is carried out, as given respectively by  and Ith. 
While the social alertness exhibits a smooth transition in the aggregated epidemic strengths as  varies, the 
social distancing has a relatively sharp transition as Ith varies. It can be seen that for all of the cost associated 
with strongest epidemics, there are relatively few cases prevented by behavioral responses because the disease 
still survives and touches most of the population. There is also a lack of any significant outbreak for the weaker 
diseases, which leaves few cases to be prevented by a social response in this range. 
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Table 1. Aggregated Epidemic Strengths for Mitigation Strategies and Responses. 
 
Social Alertness Social Distancing 
 Average 97.50% ITH Average 97.50% 
0.001 7.8554 20.3000 0.001 2.2156 4.9116 
0.002 7.2693 18.4994 0.002 2.4969 6.1980 
0.005 6.1795 15.2139 0.005 4.0062 12.0555 
0.01 5.2181 12.5227 0.01 6.6956 20.2309 
0.02 4.3147 10.0819 0.02 8.3960 22.5924 
0.05 3.3443 7.4649 0.05 8.7071 22.9317 
0.1 2.8098 6.0598 0.1 8.6845 23.0666 
0.2 2.4143 5.0334 0.2 8.7322 23.2048 
0.5 2.0291 4.1300 0.5 8.7294 23.1232 
5. Conclusions 
Within a rural community survey-based contact network, we have explored social responses to a spectrum of 
disease threats. The greatest challenge to implementing or encouraging a social response could reside in the 
decentralized and spontaneous nature of the process. As seen in figure 1, compliance is definitely an issue as 
captured in the respondents’ responses to a hypothetical epidemic. Adoption of either behavioral response to an 
epidemic would come with a reduction in social relationships. Our cost function attempts to quantify the social 
cost to individuals through the change in effective contact levels. It is important to consider that the social 
responses we model do not necessarily reflect realistic responses, but rather represent possible behavior 
changes. We demonstrate that social responses are most efficient for an intermediate range of disease strengths. 
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